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Comment
Handling Community Property Claims
Against Life Insurance in California:
The Modified Risk Payment Theory
The concept of community property is used in eight American
jurisdictions' as a method to protect the contributions of each spouse
to the acquisition and maintenance of the marital estate. 2 The system,
however, is not perfect and many difficult issues can arise when
community property is distributed. Life insurance is a unique form
of property that raises unique community property issues in both the
1. The community property jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. See Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property
and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. Rav. 20, 20-21 (1967) (discussing derivation of
community property laws in American jurisdictions). Wisconsin has adopted a substantial
portion of the Uniform Marital Property Act. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.01-766.65 (West
Supp. 1986). The Uniform Marital Property Act borrows heavily from community property
concepts. See UNw. MA aimi PROP. ACT, prefatory note at 6-7 (Proposed Official Draft 1983).
2. The original purpose of the community property concept was not to create equality
between spouses. G. McKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ComMUNrY PROPERTY § 62 (2d ed.
1925). The concept of community property was probably developed in order to preserve familial
property. Id. at § 61. Modem California community property law operates on the theory that
nonmonetary contributions of a spouse to the community estate are as important as financial
contributions. See, e.g., Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 251 (1859). The court stated that:
"IT]he marriage, in respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and
possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution ...... Id. See also
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 216 (1981) ("Like seven other states, California treats all
property earned by either spouse during the marriage as community property; each spouse is
deemed to make an equal contribution to the marital enterprise .... "). See generally In re
Marriage of Brigden, 80 Cal. App. 3d 380, 389-90, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722-23 (1978).
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dissolution and decedent's estate contexts.3 An insured has the right
to designate a beneficiary under the terms of a life insurance con-
tract.4 Community property issues arise when community property
funds are used to pay premiums, yet the designated beneficiary is
someone other than the noninsured spouse. 5 The treatment of life
insurance in the dissolution setting is distinct from that in the
decedent's estate setting. The reason for this distinction is that in
the decedent's estate context, the value of a life insurance policy is
absolutely liquidated. In the dissolution context, on the other hand,
valuation of life insurance is extremely difficult because the policy
is intangible. 6 One of the major problems in dividing life insurance
policies upon dissolution is that the rules designed to govern the
death situation do not effectively translate into the dissolution con-
text. The challenge is to provide for a unified analysis that treats
division of life insurance in accordance with its unique properties as
an asset.
There are three basic theories that have been applied to community
property claims against life insurance proceeds. The inception of title
theory awards the proceeds to the estate making the first premium
payment. 7 The apportionment theory awards the proceeds in accord-
ance with the pro rata share of premium payments made over the
life of the policy by the separate and community estates.8 The risk
payment doctrine recognizes that, usually, only the most recent
premium payment purchases the protection provided by the life
insurance policy.9 The result of the risk payment theory is that life
insurance proceeds are ordinarily awarded to the estate which has
paid the last premium.' 0
3. Compare Life Ins. Co. v. Cassidy, 35 Cal. 3d 599, 605-07, 676 P.2d 1050, 1052-54,
200 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30-32 (1984) (death) and Shaw v. Board of Admin., 109 Cal. App. 2d 770,
776-77, 241 P.2d 635, 638-39 (1956) (death) with Cardew v. Cardew, 192 Cal. App. 2d 502,
516-17, 13 Cal. Rptr. 620, 628 (1961) (dissolution).
4. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE Lnr INSURANCE CONTRACT 157 (4th ed.
1979); S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, Lnu INSURANCE 152 (9th ed. 1976).
5. Compare Mayman v. Brown, 12 Cal. App. 2d 272, 273, 55 P.2d 539, 539 (1936) (all
premiums paid from community property) and Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175, 157
P.2d 841, 842 (1945) (all premiums paid from community property) with Gettman v. City of
Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 197 P.2d 817, 819 (1948) (portion of premiums paid
from community property).
6. See infra note 18. See also In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1025,
214 Cal. Rptr. 634, 637 (1985) (discussion of difficulty in valuing life insurance upon
dissolution).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 64 & 67-85.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 65 & 87-95.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 66 & 96-111.
10. See id.
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This comment will explore the issues raised by community property
claims against life insurance policies." California law regarding dis-
tribution of community property upon dissolution of marriage or
death of a spouse will be discussed. 12 An explanation of the nature
of life insurance as an asset 13 will be followed by a brief survey of
the various approaches of the community property jurisdictions to
community property claims against life insurance proceeds. 14 Recent
California law on divisibility and distribution of life insurance upon
dissolution and death will then be detailed, including a discussion of
an appellate level split of authority regarding divisibility of term
insurance upon dissolution of marriage.15 Finally, this comment will
suggest that a modified risk payment theory should be adopted in
order to treat life insurance in accordance with its nature as an
asset. 16
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
California law requires equal division of all community property
upon dissolution of marriage. 17 Intangible assets' 8 are divisible to
the extent that they can be properly valued.' 9 If a proper present
value cannot be ascertained at the time of the dissolution proceed-
ing, California courts are empowered to retain jurisdiction over the
11. See infra text accompanying notes 17-206.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 17-26.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 27-60.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 61-122.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 123-81.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 182-206.
17. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1986).
18. An intangible asset is defined as "a non-physical, non-current asset which exists only
in connection with something else." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 726 (5th ed. 1979). Term life
insurance is intangible property under this definition because payment of the policy proceeds
is contingent upon the death of the insured occuring during the term specified by the contract.
See D. McGrL, Lrm INsuRANCE 43-44 (rev. ed. 1967).
19. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 566-67, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 638-39 (1976) (nonvested pension rights subject to division in a marriage dissolution
proceeding). See also In re Marriage of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 686-88, 566 P.2d 249, 252-
54, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615, 618-19 (1977) (employee termination benefits held divisible); In re
Marriage of Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 1025-26, 214 Cal. Rptr. 634, 637-38 (1985)
(term life insurance divisible upon dissolution); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal. App. 3d 780,
784-85, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679-80 (1984) (contingent employee stock option subject to division);
In re Marriage of Fenton, 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 460-62, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600-02 (1982)
(goodwill of ongoing law practice held divisible); In re Marriage of Rives, 130 Cal. App. 3d
138, 150-52, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572, 577-79 (1982) (goodwill of ongoing beekeeping business held
divisible); In re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 515, 519-21, 137 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319-20
(1977) (contingent retirement annuity plan held divisible). But cf. In re Marriage of Sullivan,
37 Cal. 3d 762, 765, 691 P.2d 1020, 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr 354, 357 (1984) (professional education
held not subject to division).
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property, 20 valuing and dividing it when a reasonably certain value
becomes apparent. 2'
Distribution of a deceased spouse's estate generally occurs in a,
probate proceeding, although life insurance is considered a nonpro-
bate asset.22 If a spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse is entitled
to all of the community property23 A deceased spouse may have
attempted to dispose of community property by will or by inter vivos
transfer. While a decedent is entitled to exercise testamentary power
over half of the community property, the surviving spouse can
invalidate the transaction to the extent that the attempted disposition
represents more than half of the community property.24 This rule
prevails when an insured designates a life insurance policy beneficiary
other than the surviving spouse.2s If the policy was purchased with
community funds and the beneficiary is not the surviving spouse, the
surviving spouse is entitled to a share of the proceeds as community
property.26
TIBE NATURE OF LIFE INSURANCE
A life insurance policy is a unilateral contract27 in which the
payment of a premium binds the insurer to pay a specified sum to
20. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (Vest Supp. 1986).
21. Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (because of
uncertainties affecting the vesting and maturation of some rights, the trial court should not
attempt to divide present value upon dissolution but instead should award an appropriate
share of the right when it is to be paid). See also In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App.
3d 853, 858-59, 195 Cal, Rptr. 199, 201 (1983) (failure to retain jurisdiction over contested
asset reversed); In re Marriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 676, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94, 100(1978) (attempt to divide disability allowance of a nondisabled spouse held an abuse of
discretion).
22. Estate of Welfer, 110 Cal. App. 2d 262, 265, 242 P.2d 655, 656 (1952). "It is well
settled that a beneficiary under an insurance policy takes by virtue of the contract of insurance
rather than by the law of succession . . . ." Id.
23. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a) (vest Supp. 1986). Intestate succession, however, will
not be applied to life insurance proceeds. Welfer, 110 Cal. App. 2d at 265, 242 P.2d at 657
(1952).
24. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6101(b) (West Supp. 1986) (testamentary disposition); Trimble v.
Trimble, 219 Cal. 2d 340, 347-48, 26 P.2d 477, 480-81 (1933) (inter vivos transfer).
25. Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799, 803, 376 P.2d 563, 566, 26 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638(1962); Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 2d 399, 404, 353 P.2d 725, 728, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13,
16 (1960); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 215, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-17 (1976);
Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 785, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824, 837 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 171 Cal. App. 3d 148, 159-61, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174,
181-82 (1985); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 606, 214 P. 61,
63 (1923).
27. See 1 A. CoRaIN, CoaaN oN CONTRACTS §§ 21, 71 (1963) (discussing unilateral
contracts). In a unilateral contract, the offeree is not obligated to perform, but if the offereedoes perform then the offeror is bound. Id. In the life insurance context the insured is usually
1987 / Modified Risk Payment Theory
designated beneficiaries upon the insured's death. 28 As a general rule,
an insurer will require evidence that an individual is insurable29 before
issuing the policy.3 0 A life insurance policy protects against the risk
of pecuniary loss occasioned by the death of the insured by paying
a specified sum to designated beneficiaries when the insured dies.
31
The specified sum, generally the face amount, is paid from a fund
not bound to pay the premiums, but if premiums are paid, the insurance company is bound
to perform. See Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 508, 513 (E.D.
La. 1952), decree modified, 206 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1952). Although failure to pay premiums
causes the policy to lapse, there is no breach of contract by the insured. D. McGnLL, supra
note 18, at 472-73.
28. 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTiCE §§ 2, 3 (1981).
29. To determine insurability, life insurance companies generally examine the family
medical history of the potential insured for indications of genetically transmitted susceptibility
to disease. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 6, 360-72. The companies also
require that the insured submit evidence of current medical condition. Id. If the family history
reveals high susceptibility to fatal disease or if the medical evidence reveals an abnormal health
condition, the potential participant can be declared uninsurable or a substandard risk. Id. at
373-78, 391-92. The insurability requirement is designed to prevent the phenomenon of adverse
selection against a life insurance company. Id. at 6, 360-72. The entire life insurance system
is predicated on the concept that a statistically significant number of randomly selected
individuals will contribute to a general fund which, when invested, will yield an amount
capable of funding the face value of all policies issued by the insurance company upon the
death of any of the participants under the plan. Individuals who know or suspect that they
are in poor physical health are more likely to purchase life insurance than those in good
health. If individuals in poor health were allowed to participate in a life insurance plan without
any health requirements, the mortality rate of life insurance participants would be much higher
than the general population. The result of an increased mortality rate would be prohibitive
premium rates for the population at large. Id. See also Rosenbloom v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 65 F. Supp. 692, 696 (W.D. Mo. 1946) (discussion of insurability); Greenberg v.
Continental Casualty Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 506, 514-15, 75 P.2d 644, 648-49 (1938) (discussion
of insurability).
30. S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 142. Group life insurance is an important
exception to the general rule. Under most group term life insurance policies, membership in
the insured group is the only prerequisite to coverage other than payment of the premiums.
Insurability is not considered. Id. at 396-418. See also D. McGrLL, supra note 18, at 680.
These plans are usually tied to employment fringe benefit plans. S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 4, at 398. Much of the recent California litigation regarding the issues raised by
life insurance in the community property context has dealt with group life insurance. See, e.g.,
Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979); In re Marriage of Gonzalez,
168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 214 Cal. Rptr. 634. The employer typically pays most or all of the
premiums as part of a fringe benefit package. See D. Mc GILL, supra note 18, at 700-03. See
also 1 J. APPLEMiAN & J. APPL~mAN, supra note 28, § 47. Gifts received during marriage are
considered the separate property of the donee spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West
1983). Yet, under California case law, fringe benefits are not considered gifts to the employee,
but are considered part of the remuneration received for services rendered. Smith v. Lewis,
13 Cal. 3d 349, 355, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 (1975); In re Marriage of
Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974). As a result,
any group policy is potentially community property if it is part of a benefit package earned
through employment by a spouse during marriage. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 171 Cal.
App. 3d 148, 159, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174, 181 (1985).
31. 1 J. APPLEMiAN & J. APPLEmAN, supra note 28, §§ 2, 3; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 4, at 1-2.
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created by the company.32 The fund consists of premiums collected
from all people insured by the company.3 Each premium is calculated
by application of a complex formula based on the life expectancy of
an insured.14 The cost of protection becomes greater as the chances
of the insured's death increase due to advancing age. 35 The life
insurance company will collect a premium sufficient, when invested,
to yield the face value of the policy upon the actuarially expected
date of the insured's death.3 6 Although insurance companies offer a
variety of different types of policies, close scrutiny shows that all
are either term life insurance or cash value life insurance. 37
A. Distinguishing Cash Value Life Insurance from Term Life
Insurance
The key to distinguishing cash value life insurance from term life
insurance is understanding whose resources are at risk. In a cash
value policy, a portion of each premium is set aside and credited to
the insured's account.3 As each successive premium is paid, the
amount credited to the insured's account increases, thereby accruing
a cash value. 39 This accrued cash value is called the investment
element.40 Upon the death of the insured, the accrued cash value is
paid to the beneficiaries as part of the proceeds. 4'
32. D. McGIIL, supra note 18, at 133-62, 246-51; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACic, supra note
4, at 4-5, 623-31 (discussing mathematical principles behind calculation of life insurance
premiums).
33. D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 133-62, 246-51; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note
4, at 4-5, 623-31 (discussing mathematical prinicples behind calculation of life insurance
premiums).
34. D. McGiLL, supra note 18, at 133-62, 246-51; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BtLcy:, supra note
4, at 4-5, 623-31 (discussing mathematical priniciples behind calculation of life insurance
premiums).
35. C. MARKEY, CA~noRNIA FAMtLY LAW: PRATCE AND PROCEDURE § 122.03(2)(b) (rev.
ed. 1986).
36. D. McGm.L, supra note 18, at 252-60; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at
232-319 (discussing the relationship between calculation of premiums and policy values).
37. Blanton & Ipsen, Life Insurance: An Argument for Adoption of the Risk Payment
Doctrine in Idaho, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 423, 435 (1981). See generally S.S. HUEBNER & K.
BLACK, supra note 4, at 66-67 (discussion of a common form of cash value life insurance
called whole life insurance).
38. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 66-67; 1 J, APPLEmAI'J & J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 28, § 2.
39. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 66-67; 1 J. APPLEmAN & J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 28, § 2.
40. See Comment, Community and Separate Property Interests in Life Insurance Proceeds:
A Fresh Look, 51 WASH. L. Rnv. 351, 381-82 (1976). See generally D. McGILL, supra note
18, at 60-61; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEmAN, supra note 28, § 2.
41. In some situations, the entire face value of a cash value policy is not paid to the
974
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The portion of each premium not credited to the accrued cash
value is paid into the mortality pool. 42 The mortality pool is a fund
from which the insurance company pays proceeds not paid from the
accrued cash value.43 In a cash value policy, therefore, the proceeds
paid upon the death of the insured contain monies from the accrued
cash value and the mortality pool.44 The money paid from the
mortality pool is called the net amount at risk. 4 From the perspective
of the insured, the net amount at risk is the protection element
because the portion of the proceeds, not paid from the accrued cash
value, come entirely from insurance company resources. In any given
cash value policy, the net amount at risk can be calculated according
to the following formula:
46
NAR = FV - ACV
NAR = Net Amount at Risk
FV = Face Value of the Policy
ACV = Accrued Cash Value
A cash value policy, therefore, is an asset containing two elements:
the investment element, or accrued cash value, composed entirely of
the insured's resources, and the protection element, or the net amount
at risk, composed entirely of insurance company resources. 47
In a cash value policy, the right to the protection element is
purchased only by the most recent premium payment.48 Failure to
pay a premium results in a lapse of the policy and terminates the
beneficiaries. The statement in the text, therefore, is not strictly true. If the insured has
borrowed against a cash value policy and the loan is unpaid upon death, the beneficiaries will
receive the face amount less the outstanding loan balance. See W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE LAW § 11:19 (1972).
42. See 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMiAN, supra note 28, § 2.
Since [a cash] reserve is built from the insured's own money, the company, therefore,
uses the insured's own money plus interest accumulations thereon to reduce his risk
each year. If death occurs during a certain year, the company, in effect, returns
a portion of the insured's own funds to him ... and pays the balance from the
mortality pool.
Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 7-8; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 28, § 2.
46. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 7-8, 66-67; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J.
APPLEztAN, supra note 28, § 2.
47. See I J. APPLEMiAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, § 2; D. McGtL, supra note 18,
at 60; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 66-67.
48. See D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 291-93, 315-25; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra
note 4, at 55.
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protection element of the policy. 49 The investment element, however,
is not affected by lapse.50 The right to the accrued cash value remains
in the insured.
Term life insurance stands in contrast to cash value life insurance.
While cash value insurance has both investment and protection
elements, term life insurance has only a protection element.', Term
life insurance accrues no cash value 2 and only the most recent
premium purchases the right to the proceeds..3 Any payment of
proceeds comes entirely from the resources of the life insurance
company.5 4 In other words, the net amount at risk is the face value. 5
In term life insurance, failure to pay the premium terminates the
protection element and thereby eliminates any value that the policy
had.5 6 If protection for a further term is desired, a new policy must
be purchased or the old policy must be renewed.5 7 Many term
49. See D. McGIu, supra note 18, at 291-93, 315-25; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra
note 4, at 307-08.
50. See D. McGIL, supra note 18, at 291-93, 315-25; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra
note 4, at 307-08.
51. See I J. APPLEmAN & J. APPLEmAN, supra note 28, § 3; D. McGILL, supra note 18,
at 44-45; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 55.
52. The level-premium term policy is an exception to the statement in the text. See S.S.
HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 55-59; D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 33-35; 1 J.
APPLEbAN & J. APPLEAN, supra note 28, § 3. The premium on a level-premium term policy
is determined by calculating the cost of protection for the life of the policy and dividing the
desired number of payments into that cost. Thus a level premium is created, causing the
annual or semi-annual premium to remain constant throughout the duration of the policy. See
S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 58; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note
28, § 3; W. MEYER, supra note 41, § 10:9. Although the level-premium policy is a term policy,
the excess premium is perhaps better handled as an accrued cash value. See S.S. HEUDNER &
K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 7, 62-63 (excess premiums collected in early terms treated as a
reserve).
53. D. McGrLL, supra note 18, at 44. "All premiums paid for the term protection are
considered to be fully earned by the company by the end of the term, whether or not a loss
has occured, and the policy has no further value." Id.
54. See 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, § 3; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 4, at 5-7, 55 (since net amount at risk decreases as reserve increases, the face value
of a term policy is the net amount at risk because there is no accrual of a reserve in term
policies).
55. S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 7-8.
56. D. McGL, supra note 18, at 44; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, §
3. See Wall v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 33 Cal. App. 2d 112, 115, 91 P.2d 145, 147(1939) (dictum) (quarterly premiums purchase life insurance only for the quarter in which they
are paid). See also S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 55 (at the end of policy term,
policy has no further value). Many policies do contain provisions for reinstatement of coverage
subsequent to a lapse. Reinstatement is usually conditioned upon evidence of insurability. See
id. at 141-42. See also Kennedy v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 627, 635, 117 P.2d 3,
7 (1941) (discussion of reinstatement).
57. D. McGiLL, supra note 18, at 44-45; 1 J. APPLEMA&N & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28,§ 3.
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insurance policies have a renewability feature. 58 The main character-
istic of this type of term policy is automatic extension of protection
for a new term upon payment of a new and higher premium, 59
without proof of insurability. 60
CURRENT APPROACHES TO HANDLING COMMUNITY PROPERTY CLAIMS
AGAINST LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
The death of a spouse triggers distribution of community prop-
erty. 61 If community funds were used to pay life insurance premiums
and the designated beneficiary is not the surviving spouse, the sur-
viving spouse may nonetheless have a community property interest
in the proceeds. 62 Community property jurisdictions have developed
three conflicting theories designed to determine the community in-
terest in life insurance proceeds. In the life insurance context, the
right to the life insurance proceeds is the asset that is being distributed
upon the insured's death. When a community property claim is made
against a policy, the court must determine whether community funds
have paid for the right to the proceeds. If community funds have
contributed to the protection element or the investment element, then
a share of the proceeds should be awarded to the surviving spouse
as community property. 63
The inception of title theory characterizes proceeds as separate or
community depending on the character of funds used to pay the first
premium. 64 The apportionment theory divides pro rata interests in
the proceeds based on the percentage of community funds and
separate funds used to pay premiums over the life of the policy. 65
58. S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 55; D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 44-
46. a
59. 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMiAN, supra note 28, § 3; D. McGLL, supra note 18, at
31; C. MARKEY, supra note 33, § 122.03(2)(b).
60. D. McGiLL, supra note 18, at 45; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4 at 55-56;
W. MEYER, supra note 41, § 12:8.
61. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a) (West Supp. 1986).
62. See infra notes 65 & 87-95 (discussion of apportionment approach).
63. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983) (assets acquired during marriage presumed
to be community property).
64. See, e.g., Sucession of Verneville, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); McCurdy v.
McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
65. See, e.g., Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754
(1931); Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wash. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947). Under the Uniform Marital
Property Act if an insured brings a life insurance policy into the marriage and funds from
the marital estate are used to pay premiums, the proceeds are apportioned. UNW. MARITAL
PROP. ACT § 12(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1983). If a life insurance policy is purchased
during the marriage, however, the proceeds are marital property regardless of the character of
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Under the risk payment theory, the proceeds are awarded as separate
or community to the estate which made the last premium payment. 61
All of these theories contain defects in that they either fail to treat
life insurance in accordance with its true nature as an asset or they
fail to recognize the potential contribution of prior premium pay-
ments to purchase of the protection element.
A. The Inception of Title Theory
One approach to community property issues raised by life insurance
is the inception of title doctrine. 67 When confronted with a community
property claim against life insurance proceeds, a court applying the
inception of title doctrine will first determine whether community or
separate funds were used to pay the first premium 5 If the separate
estate of an insured spouse made the first premium payment, the
policy is considered a separate asset.6 9 The designated beneficiary is,
therefore, entitled to the proceeds upon the death of the insured. 70
The court will, however, require the beneficiary to reimburse the
community estate for half of the premiums paid with community
funds.7 1 If the community estate made the first payment, however,
the noninsured spouse is entitled to half the proceeds, less reimburse-
ment to the separate estate, of the full amount of any premiums
paid from the separate estate. 72
funds used to pay the premiums. Id. § 12(c)(1). The Uniform Marital Property Act, therefore,
applies the apportionment theory to policies purchased before marriage and the inception of
title theory to polices purchased during marriage. See infra text accompanying notes 67-94
(discussing the apportionment and inception of title theories).
66. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 660, 689 P.2d 46,
51 (1984).
67. An in-depth treatment of the inception of title doctrine is beyond the scope of this
comment since California does not employ the theory in life insurance cases. The textual
discussion following this footnote is a cursory treatment of the doctrine. Application of this
doctrine is complex and subject to many intricacies. For a detailed treatment of the inception
of title doctrine, see generally Comment, supra note 40, at 355-65; Blanton & Ipsen, supra
note 37, at 444-59.
68. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 384.
71. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2366 (XVest 1985); see also McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d at 384.
Cf. In re Marriage of Gowdy, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 1234, 224 Cal. Rptr. 400, 404 (1986)
(community property contributions to separate property assets reimbursable on a pro tanto
basis). But cf. In re Marriage of Camire, 105 Cal. App. 3d 859, 866-67, 164 Cal. Rptr. 667,
671 (1980) (consensual community property contributions to separate property assets not
reimbursable). Contra In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 371-73, 618 P.2d 208, 210-
11, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 664-65 (1980) (later California Supreme Court case holding that
community estate entitled to a pro tanto interest for consensual reduction of mortgage on
separate property asset, yet not expressly overruling Camire).
72. See Amason v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 428 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1970) (federal
court applying Texas law).
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The inception of title approach treats a life insurance policy like
a tangible asset acquired on installments. 73 When tangible separate
property is improved by community funds, the community estate is
reimbursed for its cash contribution. 74 The community estate, how-
ever, is not given credit for appreciation and only the actual dollar
contribution is recoverable. 75 Any life insurance premiums paid from
community funds on a policy brought into the marriage by the
insured are analogized to improvements of tangible separate prop-
erty. 76
The inception of title theory is faulty because the theory fails to
recognize the nature of life insurance as an asset. 77 Since term life
insurance contains only a protection element,78 the right to payment
of the proceeds has been purchased solely by the most recent premium
payment 9.7  The inception of title approach, however, gives the prior
estate credit for acquisition of the protection element on the basis
of the first premium payment. 0 Awarding term life insurance pro-
ceeds on the basis of the first premium payment is inconsistent with
the fact that the first premium purchased protection only during the
first term.81
Similarly, the inception of title approach mishandles cash value
life insurance. Cash value life insurance contains a protection element
and an investment element.8 In cash value life insurance the right
to the proceeds has only partially been purchased by prior premiums. 83
73. See, e.g., Rothman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755 (1939).
74. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (community estate entitled to reimbursement
for payments made on separate property assets).
75. Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4, 6 (La. 1976).
76. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 382-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
77. See Comment, supra note 40, at 357-65.
78. 1 J. APPLE~iAN & J. APPLsMAN, supra note 28, § 3; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 4, at 5.
79. See D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 44 (if the most recent premium due is not paid,
the beneficiaries of the policy receive nothing).
80. See McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
81. See In re Marraige of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203
(1983). In Munguia, the court awarded the noninsured spouse a half interest in the accrued
cash value of a life insurance policy upon dissolution. Although the court did not discuss
division of the protection element, the opinion implies that the protection element has no
value until the insured's death. Id. at 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Since prior premium payments
applied to the protection element are exhausted when the term ends, only the estate paying
the most recent premium should be awarded the protection element. See D. McGILL, supra
note 18, at 44. See also In re Marriage of Holmgren, 60 Cal. App. 3d 869, 871, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 441 (1976) (division of accrued cash value affirmed without discussion or disposition
of the protection element).
82. D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 60-61; see also Comment, supra note 40, at 381-82.
83. D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 60-61; 1 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28,
§ 2; W. MEYER, supra note 41, § 11:19.
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In a cash value policy, the prior premiums have contributed to the
investment element but not to the protection element.84 Only the
portion of the premium applied to the investment element should be
awarded to the estate paying prior premiums. The estate paying the
last premium has paid for the protection element and should be
awarded the net amount at risk."s The inception of title analysis is
faulty because the doctrine fails to recognize that title to the protec-
tion element is not purchased by the first premium payment but
rather by the last premium paid. 6
B. The Apportionment Theory
The apportionment theory also treats life insurance as an asset
acquired on an installment basis.8 7 Unlike the inception of title theory,
the apportionment theory does not characterize life insurance pro-
ceeds as separate or community property. Instead, the interests of
each estate in the coiitested policy are calculated on a pro rata basis
according to the ratio of separate and community funds used to pay
premiums over the life of the policy.88 The estate paying prior
premiums is thereby given credit for the purchase of the protection
element.8 9
The apportionment theory is unpersuasive because it ignores the
unique properties of life insurance as an asset. 90 The proceeds of
both cash value and term life insurance are treated the same under
the apportionment theory,91 yet the protection element of either type
of policy is purchased by the estate making the last premium pay-
84. D. McGIL, supra note 18, at 60-61; 1 J. APPLEmAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28,
§ 2; W. MEYER, supra note 41, § 11:19.
85. See Comment, supra note 40, at 372-73; Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 463-64.
86. See Comment, supra note 40, at 372-73; Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 463-64.
87. Comment, supra note 40, at 366.
88. See, e.g., Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583-84
(1979); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 217-18, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215-16 (1976);
Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 781, 38 Cal. Rptr. 824, 834-35 (1964); Gettman v. City
of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865-66, 197 P.2d 817, 819 (1948); Bazzell v. Endriss,
41 Cal. App. 2d 463, 464, 107 P.2d 49, 49-50 (1940); McBride v. McBride, 11 Cal. App. 2d
521, 524 , 54 P.2d 480, 482 (1936); Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App.
729, 733-34, 299 P. 754, 755 (1931).
89. Modern Woodmen, 113 Cal. App. at 733-34, 299 P. at 755.
90. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 659, 689 P.2d 48, 50
(1984) "[W]e reject the approach of the California courts. This approach is based upon the
questionable assumption that uninsurability occurs at the inception of the contract." Id.
91. Compare Dixon Lumber Co. v. Peacock, 217 Cal. 415, 416, 19 P.2d 233 (1933)
(whole life contract subject to apportionment rule) with Modern Woodmen, 113 Cal. App. at
734, 299 P. at 755 (term life contract subject to apportionment).
980
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ment. 92 A court applying the apportionment theory will award a
portion of the net amount at risk to the estate making prior premium
payments. 93 Apportionment should not be applied to the protection
element since the portion of prior premium payments applied to the
protection element was expended in providing protection during prior
terms.94 The investment element of a cash value policy, on the other
hand, should be apportioned because the investment element of prior
premiums has been applied to the accrued cash value. 95
C. The Risk Payment Theory
The risk payment theory recognizes the unique character of life
insurance as an asset.96 A court applying the risk payment theory in
a contest over a term insurance policy will award the proceeds to
the estate making the most recent premium payment. 97 The rationale
behind the risk payment theory is that only the most recent premium
payment purchases the protection element of a life inusrance policy.98
If the last premium payment was paid from a separate property
source, the protection element is declared entirely separate property.
The same principle applies when the last premium payment is made
from a community property source. If the last premium is of a mixed
character, the net amount at risk should then be apportioned. 99
92. See Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d at 659, 689 P.2d at 49-50 (term life insurance); 1 J.
APPLEmAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, § 2 (cash value life insurance).
93. See, e.g., Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979).
94. D. McGiLL, supra note 18, at 44.
95. See Comment, supra note 40, at 382.
96. See Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 428-35, 463-66; Comment, supra note 40, at
352-55, 372-90.
97. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 660, 689 P.2d 48, 51 (1984).
Other courts in community property jurisdictions have awarded the proceeds of term life
insurance on the basis of which estate paid the last premium. These courts, however, have
failed to state that they were in fact applying the risk payment theory. Id. at 659, 689 P.2d
at 50. See, e.g., Gaethje v. Gaethje, 8 Ariz. App. 47, 52, 442 P.2d 870, 875 (1968); Lock v.
Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138, 145, 444 P.2d 163, 170 (1968); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 97
Idaho 336, 340, 544 P.2d 294, 298 (1975); Phillips v. Wellborn, 89 N.M. 340, 342, 552 P.2d
471, 473 (1976).
98. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d at 659, 689 P.2d at 49-50.
99. Premium payments of a mixed separate and community character can occur when the
payment is made from a separate property and a community property source, or when funds
from a bank account containing deposits of both separate and community property are used.
See Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 917-19, 544 P.2d 956, 963-65, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820, 827-
29 (1976). Because mixed payments are necessarily commingled, an issue of tracing the funds
to their source may arise. Id. A discussion of tracing is beyond the scope of this comment.
See generally id.; In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 611-12, 536 P.2d 479, 484, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 84 (1975); Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 157-62, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307, 315-
19 (1962).
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No court has yet applied the risk payment doctrine in a cash value
life insurance proceed contest. Presumably the proceeds would be
segregated into portions representing the accrued cash value and the
net amount at risk. The accrued cash value would be apportioned
and the protection element would be awarded to the estate making
the last premium payment.1 00
Unlike the inception of title and apportionment theories, the risk
payment theory treats life insurance properly in most cases because
the risk payment theory recognizes that the last premium usually
purchases the protection element. Merely awarding the protection
element on the basis of the last premium paid, however, may ignore
the contribution of prior payments to the purchase of the protection
element. 01 If an insured becomes a substandard risk'02 or uninsurable
at a time when the prior estate is making premium payments, then
the prior estate may have contributed to procurement of the protec-
tion element at a lower cost.'0 3 The renewability feature, contained
in many life insurance policies, guarantees continued coverage at the
existing rate without regard to insurability.1 4 Without the renewability
feature, the insured would be forced to pay a higher rate or, if the
insured becomes uninsurable, go without coverage. 05 Had prior pre-
miums not been paid, the renewability feature could not operate. In
many cases, therefore, prior premiums have either allowed purchase
100. See In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203(1983) (cash value apportioned upon dissolution, no award of protection element made). See
also Comment, supra note 40, at 382 (suggesting that the cash value of a life insurance policy
be apportioned).
101. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
[I]t could be argued that policies are worth more than their cash surrender value,
or in the case of term insurance, more than nothing, based on their replacement
value. Replacement value may be significantly higher than cash surrender value in
situations where the insurability of the insured is lessened because of advancing age
or declining health, and the existing policy cannot be cancelled or contains a guaranty
of insurability. The replacement value can be obtained from an insurance broker by
inquiring as to the price of a new policy with similiar terms on the life of the
insured.
Id. See also W. HoaoooM & D. KING, CALIoRNIA PRACTICE GunDE: FAMILY LAW § 8:29.2
(rev. ed. 1986).
102. For a discussion of "lessened insurability," more commonly known as substandard
risk, see generally D. McGII, supra note 18, at 425-26; S.S. HUEBmnR & K. BLAcK, supra
note 4, at 373-78, 390-91. Uninsurability occurs when no life insurance company will issue a
policy. D. McGiLL, supra note 18, at 408-09.
103. See supra note 101 (discussion of replacement value).
104. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussion of the renewability feature).
105. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussion of insurability). See also
supra note 102 (discussion of substandard risk).
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of the protection element at a lower rate or have allowed coverage
where none would have been available. 1' 6
In the community property context, it must be determined if the
prior estate (i.e. the estate, separate or community, paying premiums
prior to a change in marital status) has contributed to purchase of
the protection element at a lower cost. Otherwise, the risk payment
theory dictates that the subsequent estate (i.e. the estate paying
premiums upon the death of the insured) be awarded the protection
element. The test to determine whether the prior estate has contrib-
uted to a lower cost protection element is based on inquiry into
replacement cost. 107 If, upon a change in marital status, an insured
could obtain comparable coverage at the existing premium rate, then
the prior estate has not contributed to a lower cost protection
element. 1 3 On the other hand, if replacement premiums would be
higher upon a change in marital status, then the prior estate has
made the protection element available to the subsequent estate at a
lower cost due to the renewability feature. The prior estate, therefore,
should be credited for contributing to a lower cost protection ele-
ment.' 9 The risk payment theory should be modified to include
consideration of replacement value. 10 Because the benefit of lower
cost protection is conferred upon the insured by the contribution of
the prior premium payments, the estate paying prior premiums should
be compensated for this contribution."'
106. See supra note 101 (discussion of replacement value).
107. Id.
108. The basic situation in which renewability will affect the cost of the protection element
is when replacement value is higher than current cost. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, §
24.45(3)(e). See also W. HoGOBOOM & D. KING, supra note 101, § 8:29.2 (discussing replacement
value). If replacement cost is higher than current cost, then the insured, by virtue of prior
premium payments, has acquired the right to the protection element at a lower cost than
would have been the case if prior premiums had not been paid. C. MARKEY, supra note 35,
§ 24.45(3)(e). The converse of Markey's proposition is if the same life insurance coverage can
be secured at the same cost as under the existing contract, then prior premiums have not
contributed to the cost of protection or any other noncumulative rights. See id.
109. See supra note 108.
110. See Comment, supra note 40, at 377-79. "However, if the courts choose to value
insurability, the risk payment doctrine can be modified to accommodate this purpose." Id.
The author of the above comment concludes that insurability is simply too difficult to value
and, therefore, there should be a conclusive presumption that the estate paying the last term
insurance premiums has purchased the policy. Id. One author however, has suggested that
replacement value is a simple way of valuing the insurability right. C. MARKEY, supra note
35, § 24.45(3)(e). See also W. HOGOBOOM & D. KING, supra note 101, § 8:29.2 (discussing
replacement value). The thrust of this comment is that a modified risk payment theory,
combining the risk payment and replacement value approaches, be adopted in California. See
infra text accompanying notes 182-205 (discussion of the modified risk payment approach).
111. The estate paying prior premiums may have helped the insured acquire the right to
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D. The Three Theories at Work: An Illustrative Hypothetical
Application of the inception of title, apportionment, and risk
payment theories can be illustrated by a hypothetical. Suppose that
Harry, a twenty-six-year-old male, purchases a renewable term life
insurance policy in 1986 with a face amount of $100,000 and pays
three yearly premiums from his separate estate." 2 In 1989, at age
twenty-nine, Harry marries Wilma and the next seven annual pre-
miums are paid from community funds."' When the policy was first
purchased, Harry designated his mother, Maria, as beneficiary. In
1995, at age thirty-six, Harry dies. Wilma then claims a community
property interest in the proceeds, while Maria claims the entire
amount. What are the relative rights of Maria and Wilma?
In an inception of title jurisdiction, the policy would be the separate
property of Harry because the first premium was paid from separate
funds." 4 Wilma would be entitled to reimbursement because the
the protection element at a lower cost than if prior premiums had not been paid. C. MARKEY,
supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). If prior premiums are paid from community funds, then the right
to lower cost protection is acquired by the community estate. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110(West 1983) (assets acquired during marriage presumed community property). Similarly, if
prior premiums are paid from separate funds, the right to the lower cost protection is acquired
by the separate estate. See CA. Crv. CODE §§ 5118, 5119 (vest 1983) (asset acquired subsequent
to legal separation presumed to be separate property).
112. The premium figures for this hypothetical were derived from consultation with NewYork Life Insurance Company agent Jim Hetherington. Conversation with Jim Hetherington(Aug. 22, 1986) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
PREMIUMS
Year Premium Accumulated Premiums
1986 $141 $ 141
1987 $147 $ 288
1988 $155 $ 443
1989 $161 $ 604
1990 $168 $ 772
1991 $175 $ 947
1992 $183 $1130
1993 $191 $1321
1994 $198 $1519
1995 $208 $1727
The premiums for the first three years of the contract are guaranteed. The premium amounts
for the fourth and subsequent years of the contract are determined each year by New YorkLife Insurance Company in accordance with performance. The actual premium payable after
the third year may be more or less than premiums listed above. The company does maintain
a maximum premium amount in each contract. Id. The hypothetical premiums used in this
comment are for purposes of illustration only.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (first premium payment determines separate
or community character of life insurance).
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premium payments made over seven years by the community estate
will be considered improvement of separate property."15 Under the
facts of the hypothetical, the community estate of Harry and Wilma
made seven premium payments totaling $1284.116 Wilma is entitled
to $642 as reimbursement for premiums paid with community prop-
erty funds and the remainder, or $99,358, is awarded to Maria.
In an apportionment theory jurisdiction, a court would look to
the total amount of premiums paid over the life of the policy." 7 In
the hypothetical case, the community estate of Harry and Wilma
paid $1284 of the $1727 in premiums over the life of the policy." 8
A court applying the apportionment theory would reason that 74.340%0
of the funds required for acquisition of the asset were paid from the
community estate and, therefore, a like percentage of the proceeds
must be considered community property." 9 In this case, $74,340 of
the proceeds will be community property and $25,660 will be separate
property. Wilma will be awarded her half of the community property
or $37,170, while Maria will receive the other $37,170 that represents
Harry's community interest. Maria should also receive the $25,660
attributable to the separate property premium payments of Harry,
giving her a total recovery of $62,830.
In a risk payment jurisdiction, a court will look to which estate
paid for the protection element of the policy. 20 In this case, the
policy is term and therefore contains only a protection element.1
2
'
Because the last premium payment in the hypothetical case was made
from the community estate of Harry and Wilma, the proceeds are
wholly community. 22 Wilma is entitled to half the proceeds, or
$50,000, as her community interest. Maria, the designated beneficiary,
is entitled to the remaining $50,000, the community interest of Harry.
THE CURRENT STATE OF CALIFORNIA LAW
When confronted with community property claims against life
insurance proceeds, California courts apply the apportionment theory
115. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (community estate entitled to reimbursement
for improvement of separate property asset).
116. Conversation with Jim Hetherington, supra note 112.
117. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (community and separate interests in life
insurance calculated on the basis of pro rata share of separate and community funds used to
pay premiums over life of the policy).
118. Conversation with Jim Hetherington, supra note 112.
119. Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583-84 (1979).
120. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 659, 689 P.2d 48, 49-50 (1984).
121. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
122. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d at 659, 689 P.2d at 49-50.
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to determine the interests of the claimants. 123 Division of life insurance
policies upon dissolution of marriage, however, has led to conflicting
decisions among the California Courts of Appeal. 24 While the ap-
portionment rule remains good law, language in recent court of
appeal decisions shows a growing recognition of the true nature of
life insurance as an asset. 125 The division of life insurance upon
dissolution of marriage and distribution of life insurance proceeds
upon death should be controlled by the same theoretical framework
in order to produce consistent results. The current state of California
law is a mixture of differing analyses and inconsistent results. Four
opinions, written over the last six years, illustrate the inconsistency.
A. Biltoft v. Wootten: Apportionment Applied in the Context of
a Contest Over Proceeds
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed
the apportionment rule in a contest over the proceeds of a term
insurance policy in the case of Biltoft v. Wootten. 26 The deceased
insured had entered into a federal employees group term insurance
policy during marriage. 127 The insured spouse and the noninsured
spouse were later legally separated. 28 Separate funds of the insured
spouse were then used to pay the premiums and the noninsured ex-
spouse was removed as designated beneficiary. 29 Following the death
of the insured, the designated beneficiaries argued that each premium
payment purchased a new contract of insurance and, therefore, the
right to the proceeds was procured by the contract in existence upon
the insured's death. 130 Implicit in the beneficiaries' argument is the
risk payment theory."'
123. Compare Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583-84 (term) with
Dixon Lumber Co. v. Peacock, 217 Cal. 415, 416, 418-19, 19 P.2d 233, 233-34 (1933) (cash
value).
124. Compare In re Marriage of Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. 237,
239 (1983) with In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 1026, 214 Cal. Rptr.
634, 637-38 (1985).
125. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Primofiore, 80 Cal. App. 3d 920, 926, 145 Cal. Rptr.
922, 925 (1978) (term life insurance policy has no value prior to the death of the insured).
See also In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203
(1983) (protection element of cash value policy not divided upon dissolution of marriage).
126. 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979).
127. Id. at 59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
128. Id. at 59-60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Under California law, remuneration received for
services rendered after legal separation is considered separate property. CAL. Cry. CODE § 5118
(West 1983); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 218, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (1976); In
re Marriage of Vall, 29 Cal. App. 3d 76, 78-79, 105 Cal. Rptr. 201, 202 (1972).
129. Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
130. Id. at 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
131. See 1 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 20.04(2)(f)(ii)(C) (J.
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The Biltoft court rejected the new contract argument, and applied
the apportionment rule instead. 32 The court asserted that at least
four contractual rights were purchased by prior premium payments.
The four rights cited by the court included protection from inquiry
into insurability, guaranteed coverage as long as federal employment
continued, the right to convert the policy to an individual policy
upon termination of employment, and continued coverage at a re-
duced face amount if conversion were not elected. 33 Because prior
premiums had contributed to acquisition of these four rights, the
court reasoned, the proceeds should be subject to the apportionment
rule. 3 4 The court, however, failed to recognize that these four rights
only affect the cost of the protection element if the existing policy
cannot be replaced with a new policy on the same terms. 135 For
example, if a new policy can be purchased at the same premium rate
without regard to insurability, then prior premiums have done nothing
to protect the insured from inquiry into insurability. Likewise, if a
replacement policy provides for conversion to an individual policy
upon termination of employment on the same terms as those in the
existing policy, then prior premiums have not contributed to the
procurement of the conversion right.
Furthermore, the court did not discuss which premium payments
purchased the protection element of the policy. Determining which
estate purchased the protection element is the crucial inquiry under
the Biltoft facts because the policy at issue contained only a protection
element. 36 Because the court is dividing the proceeds, the focus
should be on which estate purchased the right to proceeds. The other
features in a term policy should influence proceed distribution only
if they have affected the cost of the protection element.
137
Under the policy at issue in Biltoft, the insured could probably
have elected continued coverage whether or not he was still insura-
ble. 38 The only time that insurability will affect the protection element
McCahey 2d ed. 1986) (describing the risk payment theory as the annual policy theory).
132. Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
133. Id. at 61, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
134. Id. at 61-62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
135. See C. MARKEBY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). See also supra notes 101 & 108.
136. Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
137. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
138. Id. See also D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 680; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra
note 4, at 397 (discussion of the relationship between insurability and group life insurance).
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is if the insured becomes uninsurable prior to separation.' 39 If un-
insurability occurs prior to separation and a replacement policy would
require evidence of insurability,140 then the insured will not be able
to procure replacement coverage at the same premium rate. In Biltoft,
however, the existing policy probably did not require evidence of
insurability for participation because it was a group term policy.' 41
If insurability would not be considered under a replacement policy,
then uninsurability does not affect the cost of the protection element.
The insured in Biltoft probably could have secured a replacement
policy on the same terms without regard to insurability if he was
still a federal employee upon separation. 142 Similarly, if the insured
is still insurable, a replacement policy can be obtained on the same
terms as the existing policy because insurability can be proven when
selecting a new policy. 143
In summary, the Biltoft court made no effort at actual valuation
of the respective contributions of each estate to procurement of the
protection element of the policy. The court merely assumed that each
premium payment went towards purchase of the protection element
139. If the insured is uninsurable at the time of separation then replacement coverage
cannot be secured. See D. McGnL, supra note 18, at 375-407 (discussing uninsurability factors);
S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 60, 360-72 (discussing selection and classification
of life insurance risks). In fact, one becomes uninsurable because the risk of death is simply
too great. D. McGrLL, supra note 18, at 407-09 (discussing hypothetical calculation of risks).
One might think that, if a person were uninsurable, an insurance company would accept an
amount approaching the face value in return for issuance of a policy. Insurance companies
will not issue a policy under these circumstances, however, because the proceeds would be
subject to federal estate and gift tax, thereby defeating the exemption from such taxes that
the proceeds normally enjoy. See generally 4 J. RABKiN & M. JoHNsoN, FEDERAL INCOME,
GIrT AND EsTATE TAXATION § 61.07 (rev. ed. 1986) (discussing the federal estate and gift taximplications of life insurance). The insured may, however, have become a substandard riskprior to separation. See generally D. McGnLL, supra note 18, at 407, 421-30. If the insuredhas become a substandard risk prior to separation, then the community estate has contributed
to the acquisition of the protection element at a lower cost. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35,
§ 24.45(3)(e).
140. See D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 407; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at
360-72 (discussion of the concept of insurability).
141. See supra note 30 (proof of insurability usually not required for coverage under group
term life insurance).
142. See D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 680; S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at397 (discussing the relationship between group life insurance and insurability).
143. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). In fact, if the contract contains a
renewability feature, the insured will probably be able to secure coverage at a lower premium
cost. Conversation with Jim Hetherington, supra note 112. In a renewable term contract, thepremium includes a charge which represents the increased risk of adverse selection attributable
to renewability without proof of insurability. See D. McGILu, supra note 18, at 44-46. See
also supra note 27 (discussing the relationship between the renewability feature and insurability).
The reason premiums will be lower is that the life insurance company is writing a contract on
one who is currently insurable and therefore there is no danger of adverse selection. D.
MCGL, supra note 18, at 44-46.
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of the policy. 44 The crucial inquiry in determining the contribution
of prior premiums to the existing policy values is whether replacement
coverage can be secured and at what cost.145 If identical coverage at
the same premium rate can be purchased, then only the most recent
premium has purchased the nonaccrued contract rights, including the
protection element.146 Because the Biltoft court failed to make this
inquiry, the replacement value of the policy at issue in the case is
unknown. If there was no replacement value, then the court gave
prior premiums credit for an acquisition they did not make.
B. The First Step Towards Adoption of the Risk Payment
Theory: In re Marriage of Lorenz
The California Court of Appeal for the Second District confronted
term life insurance as a community property asset in the case of In
re Marriage of Lorenz.'47 The divisibility of term life insurance upon
dissolution of marriage was at issue in Lorenz. 48 The court did not
discuss when the policy was first purchased, but it is clear that
community funds were used to pay some of the premiums.149 Holding
that term life insurance cannot be divided upon dissolution, the court
stated that term policies have no value until the death of the in-
sured. 150 Biltoft was distinguished on the grounds that once the
insured has died, the value of term life insurance is easily ascertain-
able. 15' The reasoning of the Lorenz opinion, however, is inconsistent
with the underlying rationale of Biltoft that prior premiums contrib-
ute to acquisition of certain accrued values in the policy. 52 Lorenz
thus contradicts the basis of the holding in Biltoft.'53
144. By dividing the net amount at risk, the court must have assumed that the protection
element was an asset purchased on installments. See supra text accompanying notes 87 & 90-
94 (treatment of protection element as an asset purchased on installments improper).
145. See C. MAKY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
146. See id. See also Comment, supra note 40, at 372-73; Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37,
at 463-64.
147. 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 194 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1983).
148. Id. at 466, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
151. Id. at 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
152. Compare id. at 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40 ("The proceeds or benefits of the
policy, of course, have a value. However, until those benefits are payable, the policy itself is
worthless.") with Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 61-62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 583 ("These benefits were
derived from the contract which had its inception during the marriage, and were preserved by
the payment of premiums out of community funds during the nearly 20 years of the marriage.").
153. In other words, prior premium payments are exhausted because they have been
expended by providing protection. After the term has run there is nothing left of prior
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The Lorenz opinion can be read as adopting the basic tenet of the
risk payment theory that only the most recent payment purchases
the protection element. 1
-
4 The reading of Lorenz as an adoption of
the risk payment theory is premised on the fact that term insurance
has only a protection element and therefore accrues no cash value.
The risk payment theory also rejects the idea that term insurance
accrues any other value. If there are no accrued values to a term life
insurance policy, then the only value it can have is the protection
element. Because the protection element is purchased by current and
not prior premiums, the community estate in Lorenz would have no
interest because after separation, the separate estate will pay the
premium immediately prior to the death of the insured.'
If premium payments could be analogized to installment payments
in acquiring tangible property, the policy should have value prior to
the death of the insured in the same way that payment of mortgage
installments increases equity in real property. If the Biltoft pro rata
apportionment formula were to be strictly applied, the court should
retain jurisdiction over the policy until the death of the insured
because the percentage of premiums paid by the separate and com-
premiums and therefore there is no fund to accrue. See D. McGILL, supra note 18, at 44. The
situation is analogous to a long-term residential lease. If the community makes rental paymentsfor three years under a ten-year lease during which time the fair rental value increases, the
community, by maintenance of the lease, has contributed to occupancy rights under the existinglease at a lower rental value. If, however, a comparable lease could be obtained at the exact
rental value as the existing lease, there is no ascertainable present value to the prior payments
of rent. Prior rental payments have been exhausted in securing occupancy rights which havebeen used. Research has revealed no case in which a court has attempted to divide past
residential rental payments. Claimants and the courts probably recognize that money expended
on past rental payments has not created a divisible asset, but has been exhausted in providingpast occupancy rights. This is similiar to a term life insurance policy containing various
contractual rights other than pure protection. If the insured can receive identical coverage at
an identical premium, prior premiums have not lowered the cost of securing the rights
under the policy. This discussion is for purposes of illustration only. The differences between
a lease and a life insurance policy as an asset are manifest. One obvious difference is that alease is a bilateral contract while a life insurance policy is a unilateral contract. See Flynn v.Mikelion, 208 Cal. App. 2d 305, 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (1962). See also De PauwUniversity v. United Elec. Coal Cos., 299 Ill. App. 339, 345, 20 N.E.2d 146, 149 (1939)(discussion of bilateral nature of a lease). A residential lease acquired during marriage ispresumed to be a community asset. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983). The bilateral
nature of a lease, however, also creates a community debt upon the execution of the lease.See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5120.020, 5120.030, 5120.110 (West Supp. 1986). Because a lifeinsurance contract does not create an obligation on the part of the insured, a policy acquiredduring marriage does not create a community debt. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5120.020 (West
Supp. 1986).
154. See Aetna Life Ins. Co v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 657-58, 689 P.2d 48, 49-50 (1984); Comment, supra note 40, at 372-73; Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 463-64.155. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5118, 5119 (West 1983) (assets acquired subsequent to legal
separation are presumed to be separate property).
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munity estates over the life of the policy will not be known until
that time.156 By waiting until the insured's death to distribute the
protection element of the policy, a court would be consistent with
Biltoft.
Citation of Lorenz as authority for the risk payment doctrine
should be approached with caution for two reasons. First, the court
never expressly stated that it was adopting the risk payment theory.
Secondly, the court cited Biltoft as the controlling precedent in a
proceed contest.157 The failure of the court to fully analyze the
applicability of the risk payment doctrine is revealed by the citation,
with apparent approval, to Biltoft.
C. Rejection of the Lorenz Approach: In re Marriage of
Gonzalez
Confronted with the same issue as that before the Lorenz court,
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reached an
opposite result. In the case of In re Marriage of Gonzalez,'58 the
parties were married for twenty-two years prior to petitioning for
dissolution. 5 9 The husband was a military veteran whose life was
insured under both an individual term life insurance policy and a
group term life insurance policy.' 6° The court did not state how long
the policies had been in existence, but they had an aggregate face
value of $45,000.161 The husband appealed a trial court decision
awarding one policy to the wife as her separate property and the
other to the husband as his separate property.
62
The appellate court in Gonzalez, citing Biltoft, held that term
insurance policies have value prior to the death of the insured and,
therefore, the rights under the policy should be divided in a disso-
lution proceeding. 63 The Gonzalez court indicated that several factors
should be considered in determining the divisible value of the pol-
156. The authority for continuing jurisdiction is found in CaL. Crw. CODE § 4800(a) (West
Supp. 1986). See generally In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1976); In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 858-59, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199,
201 (1983); In re Marriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 676, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99
(1978).
157. Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
158. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 214 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1985).
159. Id. at 1022, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
160. Id. at 1023, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
161. Id. at 1026, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
162. Id. at 1022-23, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
163. Id. at 1025-26, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38 (citing Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d
58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979)).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
icy. 164 These factors include the face value of the policy, the amount
of the premium, the life expectancy of the insured, the convertibility
of the policy to whole life, the replacement value, and whether the
policy ever "vests" and is considered fully paid. 16 5 The factors
enumerated by the Gonzalez court are reasonable but they should
not be applied until after the death of the insured. To do so in adissolution proceeding would lead to conjectural ascertainment of
present value. 166
The Gonzalez opinion contains suggestions that support the adop-
tion of the risk payment theory. The trial court was given specificdirection to ascertain the contribution made by the community estate
to the maintenance of the policies. 167 The trial court may accept the
view that only the most recent premium purchases the protection
element of the policy. The reference of the court of appeal to the
replacement value could represent a recognition that replacement
coverage is easily obtained. 68 The ability to procure equivalent re-placement coverage should preclude a finding that the community
estate has contributed to maintenance of the policy at current rates. 6 9
From the date of legal separation on the Gonzalez facts, the premiums
on the term policies will probably be paid from the separate estate
164. Id. at 1026, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
The valuation and division of a term policy does, perhaps, pose a greater challengethan does a whole life policy, whose cash surrender value provides a convenient,
although not necessarily accurate means of present valuation. But the task is not allthat difficult. As Markey has suggested, replacement cost of a term policy may be one
method of valuation, as might the sum of the community's contributions.
Id.
165. Id.
166. The present value approach, in the term life insurance context, rests on two assumptions.The first assumption is that the contract will be in existence upon the insured's death. The second
assumption is that the insured will live until the actuarially expected date of death. Attemptingto divide upon dissolution on the basis of present value, therefore, may violate the rule that acourt should not attempt division when ascertaining value would be conjectural. See In reMarriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1978). The Andreen court stated
as follows:[A] trial court should not attempt to dispose of disability benefits which an active,
undisabled spouse may claim at some future time. The court cannot predict when or
whether the covered employee will become disabled. An attempt to divide conjecturaldisability is an abstraction based on a possibility which may never materialize.Id. at 676, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 100. Siniiliarly, in the life insurance context, dividing the presentvalue of the protection element would be conjectural because the insured's death may occur ata time when coverage does not exist. Cf. In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853,861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (cash value policy divided only as to accrued cash value upon
dissolution).
167. Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1026, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 638.168. See infra note 141 (discussion of the potential contribution of prior premiums tolowering the cost of the protection element).
169. See C. MARcEy, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
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on the term policies will probably be paid from the separate estate
of the insured. Furthermore, prior premium payments made by the
community estate were exhausted by providing protection during
prior terms and presumably replacement value is nonexistent. There
should, therefore, be no community interest in the policies.
As in Lorenz, the Gonzalez court cited Biltoft with approval.
170
The citation to Biltoft, however, creates an inconsistency. Assume
that the trial court in Gonzalez, upon remand, determines that
identical coverage could be retained at an identical premium as that
prevailing under the existing policy. Assume further that the trial
court is persuaded that only the last premium purchases the pure
protection of the term policy. Under these circumstances, the trial
court would have to determine that the separate estate has purchased
the protection element and, therefore, there is no community interest
in the policy. Yet, if the policy had never been contested in the
dissolution proceeding, the noninsured spouse would be entitled to a
community interest in the proceeds under the Biltoft formula. 171 In
both scenarios the same dollar amount of community funds have
paid premiums. The recoveries are dramatically different, however,
depending on when the community property claims are pursued.
D. Rejection of the Lorenz Approach in a Proceed Contest:
Bowman v. Bowman
In the case of Bowman v. Bowman'72 the California Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District examined the cases in the context of
a proceed contest. In Bowman, the deceased insured, Rudy, was
protected by a group term policy with a face amount of $225,000.173
At the time of his death in 1981, Rudy had been married to Mary
since 1979.174 Prior to that, Rudy was married to Celia from 1949
to 1968. 175 The contested policy was first acquired in 1964. Mary
170. Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1026-27, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39 (citing Biltoft v.
Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581).
171. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 850-51, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 641 (1976) ("[u]nder settled principles of California community property law,
property which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community property is left unadjudicated
by the decree of divorce, and is subject to future adjudication, the parties being tenants in
common meanwhile.") (quoting In re Marriage of Elkins, 28 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 59, 61 (1972)).
172. 171 Cal. App. 3d 148, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1985).
173. Id. at 159, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
174. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76.
175. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
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claimed the proceeds as designated beneficiary, while Celia asserted
her community property rights in the proceeds. 76 The trial court,
relying on Lorenz, held that Celia was entitled to nothing. 77 The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a determination
of Celia's community interest. 7 8
In the remand order, the Bowman court expressly directed the trial
court to make a determination of Celia's interest in the proceeds. 179
The court, however, provided very little guidance as to the method
of valuing that interest. 80 Despite the Biltoft citation, there seems to
have been no reason for the court to remand this case for a
determination under the apportionment theory. Assuming that the
actual premium payments over the life of the policy were available,
the court could have apportioned the proceeds according to the pro
rata interests of the claimants.' 8' The Bowman decision likely stands
176. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
177. Id. at 159, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
178. Id. at 161, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 159, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 181 ("Celia acquired an interest in the policy and
the court erred in denying her a determination of it"). The court, however, did not state that
the apportionment theory should be applied. Id.
181. Assume the following hypothetical premium payment schedule for a $225,000.00 policy
taken out in 1964 based on a male insured, age 36. (derived from Conversation with Jim
Hetherington, supra note 112):
PREMIUMS
Year Premium Accumulated Premiums
1964 $ 297 $ 297
1965 $ 342 $ 640
1966 $ 390 $ 1029
1967 $ 446 $ 1475
1968 $ 509 $ 1984
1969 $ 579 $ 2562
1970 $ 660 $ 3222
1971 $ 752 $ 3973
1972 $ 855 $ 4829
1973 $ 970 $ 5799
1974 $1094 $ 6892
1975 $1184 $ 8076
1976 $1276 $ 9352
1977 $1373 $10,725
1978 $1481 $12,206
1979 $1596 $13,801
1980 $1719 $15,520
1981 $1850 $17,370
The interests of the claimants can be estimated. Under the hypothetical, the total amount of
premiums paid over the life of the policy is $17,370. Id. Assume that from 1969-1978, Rudy's
separate estate made premium payments totaling $10,222 or 58.85% of the total. Assume
further that during the years 1964-1968, the community estate of Celia and Rudy made
994
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as a reaffirmation of the apportionment rule. Despite the specific
direction to ascertain the interests of the claimants on remand, there
is a substantial probability that the trial court will apply the Biltoft
apportionment rule.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE MODIFIED RISK PAYMENT. APPROACH
The inconsistencies of California law should be resolved by adop-
tion of a unified theoretical approach in both the marital dissolution
context and the decedent's estate context. The risk payment approach
recognizes that the protection element of a life insurance policy is
generally purchased by the most recent premium. 82 Nevertheless,
prior premium payments may have contributed to acquisition of the
protection element at a lower cost. 83 Awarding the entire proceed
amount to the estate that paid the last premium may not be consistent
with equitable distribution of potential contributions made by the
prior premium payments.1 84 The modified risk payment theory will
award the net amount at risk to the estate making the last premium
payment unless it can be shown that the prior premium payments
allowed the protection element to be secured at a lower cost. 8 1 Such
a showing is generally made when an insured has become a substand-
premium payments totaling $1,984 or 11.42% of the total. Finally, assume that in 1979-
1981, community estate of Mary and Rudy made premium payments totaling $5,164 or 29.73%
of the total. Based on these percentages, Celia should receive one half of $25,695 or $12,847.50
as her community interest under Biltoft, the remainder would go to Mary as designated
beneficiary. Had Rudy named a beneficiary other than Mary, then Mary would have received
one-half of $66,892.50 or $33,446.50 as her community interest under Biltoft. The designated
beneficary would have received $178,706.25 the amount remaining after subtracting the
$46,293.75 which represents the interests awarded to Mary and Celia.
182. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 657-58, 689 P.2d 48, 49-
50 (1984); Comment, supra note 40, at 372-73; Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 463-64.
183. C. MARKY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). The Washington Supreme Court recognized
that there was a potential contribution to maintenence of the policy by prior premium payments.
Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d at 659, 689 P.2d at 50. The court, however, declined to accept a
rule which would take the contribution into account, stating that:
We could adopt a rule requiring inquiry into the various aspects of each insurance
policy to determine what, if any, features have present value. We prefer, however,
to take a broader approach requiring inquiry only into whether the insurance policy
is a term or cash value policy. The rule we adopt will, we hope, have the advantage
of ease of application and thus avoid the time and expense of extensive litigation.
Id.
184. If the California courts choose to adopt the risk payment theory, valuation of potential
contribution by the prior estate should be made. See C. MAREY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e)
(discussing replacement value approach). See also W. HoGoaooM & D. KiNG, supra note 101,
§§ 8:29.2, 8:313 (discussing replacement value).
185. C. MAREY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). The term "modified risk payment theory"
is derived from Comment, supra note 40, at 377 (suggesting that the risk payment theory
could be modified to account for insurability).
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ard risk or uninsurable prior to a change in marital status. For
example, if insurability is a factor under the existing policy and a
married insured has become a substandard risk prior to legal sepa-
ration, then the community property estate has contributed to a lower
cost protection element. The same principle applies to the separate
property estate if an insured becomes a substandard risk prior to
marriage. If insurability is a factor under the existing policy of the
unmarried insured, then the separate property estate has contributed
to a lower cost protection element.'8 6
After showing that the prior estate has contributed to a lower cost
protection element, this contribution should be valued as if the prior
estate were still paying a portion of the premium paid immediately
before the death of the insured. 87 The valuation of the prior estate's
contribution should be based on the difference between the premium
actually paid and that which would have been paid had the insured
been forced to obtain a replacement policy upon the change in
marital status. The replacement value can be calculated by application
of the following formula:
RP - AP
RP
RP = Replacement Premium
AP = Actual Premium
RV = Replacement Value
The replacement premium is the amount that the insured would be
forced to pay in order to obtain comparable coverage, while the
actual premium is the amount actually paid for the protection element
existing upon the death of the insured. The difference between the
replacement premium and the actual premium, divided by the re-
placement premium, would yield the replacement value. For purposes
of valuing the contribution of the prior estate, the replacement
premium is treated as if it were the actual cost of the protection
element. The replacement value is expressed as a percentage which
represents the pro rata share of the proceeds awarded to the prior
186. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
187. Only the prior estate's contribution to the last premium payment should be considered
when ascertaining replacement value. The reason for this is that, just like prior cash contri-butions, all prior intangible contributions to acquisition of the protection element have been
exhausted by providing protection during prior terms. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text. Only the most recent premium purchases the protection element, whether or not the
amount of the premium has been kept constant due to the guaranteed insurability. Id.
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estate. 88 Even if no replacement coverage could have been obtained,
however, the prior premium contribution should not be valued at
more than fifty percent. The rationale behind the fifty percent
limitation is that the protection element is still not a cumulative asset
and therefore the prior premiums and the most recent premium are
mutually dependent on one another for the existence of the protection
element.'8 9
A. Consequences of the Modified Risk Payment Theory in a
Proceed Contest
If the designated beneficiary of a life insurance policy is someone
other than the spouse or ex-spouse of a deceased insured, and
community funds were used to pay premiums, a contest over the
policy proceeds may ensue upon the death of the insured. Although
cash value life insurance can be distinguished from term life insur-
ance, the modified risk payment theory should be applied to both.190
The investment element of a cash value policy should be identified,
isolated, and apportioned according to the relative dollar contribu-
tions of each estate. 191 On the other hand, the modified risk payment
188. See C. MARKEY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e). An application of the formula in the
text would be as follows. Suppose at the time of separation the insured could only secure
replacement coverage at a premium of $200 annually. Suppose further that the insured's
existing premium is $150. The suggested formula treats the difference between the two premiums
as if the community estate were contributing to premium payments in the amount of that
difference. In the hypothetical case, the community has made a 25% contribution to the
protection element. The community estate, therefore, is entitled to 25% of the proceeds. The
percentage contribution of the community estate may vary depending on available replacement
premium rates between the time of separation and the time of the insured's death. As Markey
has suggested, however, replacement premium rates can be adduced from expert testimony.
See id.
189. The noninsured spouse may not want to wait until the insured's death to recover.
The spouse can be given a choice whether to wait or take a present value share of the
community's future contribution to premium payments. The future contribution of the com-
munity estate could be ascertained by taking the dollar amount of premiums that the insured
can expect to pay for the duration of his or her life expectancy and multiplying the result by
the percentage figure yielded from the replacement value calculation. See supra note 188 and
accompanying text (replacement value formula). But cf. supra note 166 and infra text
accompanying note 202 (protection element should not be divided upon dissolution because
valuation would be conjectural). Recovery of present value should serve to terminate the
interest of the noninsured spouse in the proceeds. See In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d
418, 428 n.9, 629 P.2d 1, 7 n.9, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493, 499 n.9 (1981) (demand for immediate
award of immature pension payments irrevocable election precluding award of future benefits).
190. See Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at 464-66; Comment, supra note 40, at 381-88.
191. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussion of the applicability of the
apportionment rule to the investment element). See also Blanton & Ipsen, supra note 37, at
464-66, 470-71; Comment, supra note 40, at 383. See also I J. APPIEmAN & J. APPLEmAN,
supra note 28, § 2; S.S. HUFEa-R & K. BLAcK., supra note 4, at 66-67 (discussing investment
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doctrine should be applied to the protection element in precisely the
same manner whether the policy at issue is term or cash value. 12
The protection element is usually acquired by the estate making
the most recent premium payment. 193 There should, therefore, be a
presumption that the estate making the last premium payment is
entitled to the net amount at risk. 94 The rationale behind the last
premium presumption is that since acquisition of the protection
element generally is made by the last premium, the estate paying the
last premium, whether community or separate, has acquired the right
to the net amount at risk. Furthermore, the insured will generally be
able to secure comparable replacement coverage.'95 The availability
of comparable replacement coverage guarantees that prior premium
payments will have made no ascertainable contribution to lowering
the cost of the protection element. 96 Once representatives of the
element of whole life contracts). Although ascertaining the cash value of a policy may appear
to be simple, there are certain facts which give rise to complex issues. See Blanton & Ipsen,
supra note 37, at 464-66. At least three major issues can arise. First, an insured spouse may
borrow against the accrued cash value of the policy. Second, a premium payment may be
missed but coverage remains in effect due to the Automatic Premium Loan feature which pays
the missed premium from the accrued cash value. Third, the relative rights to compound
interest on the accrued cash value may also be at issue. Id. A discussion of these issues is
beyond the scope of this comment, although counsel should keep them in mind when handling
a case involving cash value insurance.
192. See In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203
(1983) (accrued cash value of a life insurance policy must be divided upon dissolution of
marriage). See also In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 428, 629 P.2d 1, 7, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 493, 499 (1981) (when a property right contains both mature and immature elements,
the matured rights should be divided upon dissolution); In re Mendenhall's Estate, 182 Cal.
App. 2d 441, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960) (cash value contributions of the community must be
ascertained and divided despite beneficiary designation).
193. Most Americans are insurable. See Comment, supra note 40, at 376-77 n.108. Because
most Americans are insurable, replacement contracts at existing rates are readily available. Id.
In most cases, therefore, prior premium payments will not have contributed to acquisition of
the protection element. See C. MARE, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
194. See Comment, supra note 40, at 377-79. An ex-spouse endeavoring to prove that the
community estate has contributed to maintenence of the policy should have the burden of
proof because in the usual case only the subsequent, separate estate has purchased the right
to the proceeds upon the occurrence of the insured's death. See C. McCo,,ICK, McCoRMicic
oN EVIDENCE § 343 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984).
[T]he most important consideration in the creation of presumptions is probability.
Most presumptions have come into existence primarily because the judges have
believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so
probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of fact A until the
adversary disproves it.
Id. In the case of a contest over a life insurance policy, fact B is proof of which estate has
paid the last premium payment, while fact A is that the last premium has purchased the
protection element.
195. Replacement value approaches zero when uninsurability has not occurred or assuming
that the insured has not become a substandard risk. See supra note 193 (availability of
comparable replacement contracts). See also S.S. HuEBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 4, at 372.
196. Perhaps counsel would be wise to advise insurable clients to drop existing policies in
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estate making prior premium payments have shown that prior pre-
miums have contributed to lowering the cost of the protection ele-
ment, then either side can put on evidence showing the replacement
value of that contribution according to the formula discussed previ-
ously. 197
Insurability may have a significant impact on replacement value.
If insurability is a factor under the terms of the policy, the relevant
time for inquiry into the insurability of the deceased is the point at
which the subsequent estate assumed the premium payments from
the prior estate. 19 In most cases the subsequent estate will have
purchased the protection element of the policy. 199 The only time the
prior estate will have contributed to a lower cost protection element
is when there is a replacement value.
B. Consequences of the Modified Risk Payment Theory in the
Marital Dissolution Context
In a dissolution proceeding, the type of policy at issue before the
court, whether term or cash value, should first be ascertained. If the
policy at issue is term life insurance, then the relevant features, such
dissolution cases. If existing policies are dropped, it would be clear that prior premiums applied
to the protection element would no longer exist. See supra note 141 (availability of comparable
replacement contracts). On the other hand, should the California courts continue to apply the
apportionment rule, intentionally allowing policies to lapse may be construed as a violation of
the duty of good faith owed between spouses with respect to management and control of
community assets. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1986). See also C. MAPXEY,
supra note 35, § 5.52(3) (intentional mismanagement of community assets may give rise to a
cause of action under California Civil Code § 5125(e)).
197. See supra text accompanying note 187. The replacement value theory is simply a way
of arguing that the community is entitled to appreciation of community assets. If replacement
value is higher, the value of the protection element has, in effect, appreciated due to past
premium payments because it can now be purchased at a lower cost. See Juick v. Juick, 21
Cal. App. 3d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1971). In Juick, one spouse was awarded the community
property house by the trial court. Id. at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The other spouse was
awarded a note representing a half interest in the home. Id. The spouse holding the note
argued that equal division of community property had not been achieved because any appre-
ciation of the home would accrue to the homeowner spouse. Id. at 426-27, 98 Cal. Rptr. at
328-29. The Juick court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the effect
of appreciation on each party's interest. Id. at 428-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
198. If the insured could have replaced the contract at existing premiums after separation,
then the community has not contributed to procurement of the protection element. See C.
MAIuCY, supra note 35, § 24.45(3)(e).
199. As a general proposition, uninsurability occurs later in life and therefore it is more
likely that the subsequent estate will be paying the premiums when uninsurability occurs. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 658-59, 689 P.2d 48, 50 (1984). See
also Comment, supra note 40, at 376. As mortality rates decrease, it is likely that replacement
value will actually decline. See C. MAvu y, supra note 35, §§ 122.03(2)(b), 24.45(3)(e). A
person, age 40, has less chance of dying in the coming year than a similiar person 40 years
ago. The smaller the chance of the risk of death occurring, the lower the premiums will be.
Id.
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as renewability or level premium plan, should be considered. 2°0 If the
court determines that prior premium payments have not contributed
to replacement value, then the noninsured spouse should be denied
any interest in the policy because the community estate will not
purchase the protection element. 20 ' If there is a replacement value,
the court should retain jurisdiction over the policy, applying the
replacement value formula to the policy upon the death of the
insured. The court should not attempt division of the protection
element prior to the death of the insured because determination of
the replacement value would be conjectural. 202
Cash value life insurance presents a slightly different problem. The
portion of the cash value accrued during marriage should be ascer-
tained and divided. 203 The protection element of a cash value policy
should be treated in exactly the same manner as a pure term policy. 20
In the case of either term or cash value insurance, the court should
not attempt to divide the protection element until the death of the
insured, retaining jurisdiction over the policy until that time. 201
CONCLUSION
This comment has illustrated that life insurance is a unique asset
which presents a challenge for the courts when both community and
separate funds are used to pay premiums. By failing to recognize the
nature of life insurance, courts have inadequately responded to the
200. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 1026, 214 Cal. Rptr. 634,
638 (1985).
201. See In re Marriage of Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 468, 194 Cal. Rptr. 238, 239(1983) (term life insurance not divisible upon dissolution). See also In re Marriage of Munguia,
146 Cal. App. 3d 858, 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1983) (protection element not divided
upon dissolution).
202. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 639 (1976). See also Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 858-59, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 201; In re
Marriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 676, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99-100 (1978).
203. Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
204. See W. HorOBOOM & D. KiNG, supra note 101, § 8:313.
Whole life insurance is usually valued at its cash surrender value (ordinarily
established in the policy).
However, this is not a "hard and fast" rule. Special circumstances may make
cash surrender value unrealistic. For example, if the insured is no longer "insurable,"
the value of a whole life (and possibly a term life) policy is probably not its cash
surrender value, because the policy cannot be purchased any longer.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Like Hogoboom and King, this author suggests
that inquiry into replacement value is relevant in both term and cash value cases. Unlike
Hogoboom and King, however, this author suggests that the investment and protection elements
of cash value life insurance be treated separately and in accordance with the unique properties
of each. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
205. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussion of continuing jurisdiciton).
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challenge. If California courts begin to acknowledge that the nature
of a term life insurance policy as an asset is pure protection, division
of community assets will be consistent with what term life insurance
purchases. Furthermore, the distinction between cash value life in-
surance and term life insurance should be recognized. Treating the
protection and investment elements distinctly, yet in accordance with
the unique properties of each, will result in the equitable distribution
of cash value life insurance.
California law now substantially overcompensates the estate which
has made prior payments. 201 The reason for this overcompensation
is the failure to analyze the asset at issue. Adoption of the modified
risk payment approach to the distribution and division of life insur-
ance will result in a more just division of community assets. The
modified risk payment theory will compensate in accordance with
the contribution made by each estate towards procurement of the
protection afforded by a life insurance policy.
Daniel A. Johnson
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206. See Biltoft, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581. See also Modern Woodmen of
America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931).

